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The Funding Problem
State unemployment insurance (UI) programs have recent 
ly been experiencing financial problems of a magnitude un 
precedented in their entire history. A series of severe and 
lengthy recessions since 1970 has caused benefit payments to 
exceed tax revenues by wide margins in many years, depleted 
trust fund balances and forced several states to borrow large 
amounts from the federal loan fund account in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund. During calendar year 1983, 27 
states borrowed a total of $6.6 billion. The total outstanding 
debt at the end of the year was $13.3 billion. 1 During 1984, a 
year of strong economic growth, state indebtedness was 
reduced but still remained at $9.5 billion on December 31, 
1984.
State UI programs, created in the 1930s, 2 were intended to 
be self-financing social insurance programs that levied 
payroll taxes on covered employers and paid benefits to eligi 
ble unemployed workers. Typical beneficiaries are laid-off 
workers who satisfy other eligibility criteria, e.g., they have 
sufficient employment or earnings prior to unemployment, 
are able to work, and available for work. Workers collect UI 
benefits for a limited time period until they are recalled, find 
another job, leave the labor force, or exhaust their benefits. 
Maximum regular benefit duration allowed under state laws 
is usually 26 weeks or less, but the actual duration of benefits 
drawn per claimant has typically averaged from 12 to 16 
weeks during the last 10 years.
2 The Funding Problem
A unique feature of UI programs is their method of taxa 
tion. 3 The original authorizing legislation (Title IX of the 
1935 Social Security Act) provided for a Federal Unemploy 
ment Tax (or PUT) that was to equal 3 percent of payroll in 
covered employment and to be paid by all covered 
employers. The legislation also provided for a tax offset for 
state UI taxes paid, up to 90 percent of the PUT or 2.7 per 
cent of payroll for employers in states that established ac 
ceptable UI programs. If employers paid UI taxes to the state 
at a rate of less than 2.7 percent, they could still receive full 
credit for the maximum PUT tax offset provided their reduc 
ed state tax rate was based on experience. Thus the net PUT 
tax rate which employers paid to the federal government was 
.3 percent. Originally the UI payroll taxes were levied on 
total payroll, but in 1940 the taxable wage base was set at 
$3,000 per employee to correspond with the wage base under 
the OASI (or Social Security) program.
This general arrangement for federal and state UI taxes 
has continued down to the present. In 1984, the net PUT tax 
rate was levied at a rate of .8 percent of taxable payrolls 
(wages up to $7,000 per covered employee), after the tax off 
set of 2.7 percent for state UI taxes. In 1985 the same net 
PUT rate continues to be in force, but the maximum offset 
doubles to 5.4 percent. Each state UI program must have a 
maximum tax rate of at least 5.4 percent. 4 Thus, between 
1938 and 1985, the net PUT tax rate has increased from .3 to 
.8 percent of taxable payroll, the gross PUT rate has increas 
ed from 3.0 to 6.2 percent and the tax offset has increased 
from 2.7 to 5.4 percent. The taxable wage base, set at $3,000 
in 1940, is $7,000 in 1985.
State UI programs are influenced by both federal and state 
legislation. The individual states determine their own 
eligibility criteria, weekly benefit levels, and the number of 
weeks of benefits payable. In most states, weekly benefits are
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50 to 60 percent of previous wages, but subject to a weekly 
benefit maximum. Maximum regular benefit duration 
payable is usually 26 weeks.
The UI payroll taxes levied by the states on covered 
employers are deposited in the Unemployment Trust Fund in 
the U.S. Treasury and credited to individual state trust fund 
accounts. The states draw on these accounts to make benefit 
payments. The federal unemployment tax revenues, now .8 
percent of taxable payroll, are paid directly to the U.S. 
Treasury, and then allocated to various federal accounts in 
the Unemployment Trust Fund. This component of revenue 
(the Federal Unemployment Tax or FUT) pays for federal 
and state UI administrative costs, including the Ul-related 
costs of the U.S. Employment Service (ES). Since 1970, a 
portion of FUT revenues has been allocated to finance the 
federal share of extended benefit (EB) costs. Between 1970 
and 1983, the FUT tax rate has increased to pay for higher 
EB costs and increased costs of UI administration. 5
The employer payroll taxes imposed by the states to 
finance program benefits are experienced rated. Under ex 
perience rating, benefit payments made to former employees 
and to workers on temporary layoff are a major determinant 
of employer taxes. Experience rating was intended to reduce 
labor turnover by making employers financially liable for 
layoffs. Those with fewer layoffs pay less taxes. In practice, 
covered employers are only partially experience rated so that 
the cost of a given layoff may not be fully borne by the 
employer who initiates the layoff. Thus, an important frac 
tion of state UI taxes (often up to half) is raised by flat rate 
levies applied to all covered employers. As with benefits, 
employer tax rates are determined by state legislation 
(although the minimum tax base per employee and the max 
imum statutory employer tax rates are influenced by federal 
legislation).
4 The Funding Problem
State UI programs are supposed to be fully self-financed. 
Trust fund balances act as cushions in financing benefit 
payments during recessions. After being drawn down, they 
are to be rebuilt in subsequent economic expansions when 
experienced rated employer taxes rise.
The actual management of state UI trust fund balances 
has departed substantially from the preceding description. In 
fact, there has been a rather steady erosion of UI trust funds 
dating from the late 1940s. During the 1970s, a financing 
problem in state UI became apparent, and it has become an 
even more serious problem in the present decade. Between 
1972 and 1979, 23 of the 51 "state" programs (including 
D.C.)6 needed federal loans to continue payments for regular 
state UI benefits and the state share of extended benefits. 
From January 1, 1980 to December 31, 1984, more than 
$17.9 billion in loans were disbursed among 32 jurisdictions. 
Altogether, 38 states have borrowed at least once between 
1972 and December 1984.
The state UI funding problem is the result of several 
distinct and identifiable factors. (1) The economy has ex 
perienced four separate recessions since 1969: in 1970-71, 
1974-75, 1980 and 1981-82. Two of the recessions (1974-75 
and 1981-82) were especially severe by historic standards. 
Frequent and severe economic downturns have caused very 
heavy demands for benefits between 1970 and 1983. (2) The 
recessions of the mid-1970s and the 1980s have had an 
unusual regional composition. States in the Northeast and 
Midwest have experienced worse unemployment problems 
than other states. As a result, the most serious funding prob 
lems have been concentrated in the so-called frost belt states. 
(3) Indexing for wage changes was introduced into many 
state programs in an asymmetrical manner during the 1960s 
and the 1970s. The benefit side was indexed to average wages 
while the taxable wage base was not indexed and changed on 
ly infrequently, e.g., the wage base for the Federal
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Unemployment Tax increased only in 1972, 1978 and 1983. 
As a result, tax revenues have tended to grow more slowly 
than benefit payments. The taxable wages that support the 
program now represent less than half of total wages in 
covered employment. (4) The scope of employer-financed 
benefit payments was broadened in 1970 with the creation of 
the Federal-State Extended Benefit (EB) program. Because 
of the high average rate of unemployment since 1972, benefit 
payouts under EB have exceeded original expectations. More 
details about each of these four contributing factors will be 
discussed later in this chapter under "Origins of the Funding 
Problem."
Trust Fund Balances and Loans 
to State UI Programs
Long Term Trust Fund Decline
Table 1-1 illustrates with aggregate data the funding situa 
tion for state UI programs over the post-World War II 
period. The seven years that are identified are years im 
mediately prior to recessions. End of year aggregate trust 
fund balances for these years (column 1) ranged from $6.7 to 
$12.6 billion. In absolute magnitude the 1979 balance was 
not a great deal larger than the 1948 balance and less than 
that of 1953. Column 2 shows that as a percentage of 
covered wages and salaries the fund balance declined from 
7.9 in 1948 to .9 percent in 1979.
Columns 3, 4 and 5 provide information on the benefit 
potential that the trust fund balances represent. The average 
benefit paid for a week of total unemployment appears in 
column 3. Weekly benefit levels that grew by about half be 
tween 1948 and 1959 and again between 1959 and 1969, near 
ly doubled between 1969 and 1979. High inflation coupled 
with indexation combined to produce rapid growth in weekly 
benefit levels during the 1970s. Average potential regular
Table 1-1 
Aggregate State UI Trust Fund Balances and Related Measures
Pre-Recession Years 1948 to 1979a































































































SOURCE: Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 are from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns 5 and 7 are
based on other data in the table.
a. Data exclude Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
b. Payable under state regular benefit provisions, excluding federal-state shared extended benefits.
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benefit duration (excluding extended benefits) for claimants 
(column 4) also has grown since 1948, but since 1969 it has 
remained close to 24 weeks.
Column 5 then shows the implications of growth in 
average weekly payment levels and potential duration on the 
benefit capacity of the trust fund balances. In 1948, the 
$7,603 million year-end balance could have financed benefits 
for nearly 19 million persons at average total benefit entitle 
ment levels that year. By 1979 the trust fund could cover only 
4 million persons at such levels, less than one-fourth of the 
1948 capacity, so measured.
A proxy for the potential unemployment risk exposure of 
state UI is the level of covered employment. Between 1948 
and 1979 it more than doubled, rising from 33 to 71 million 
(column 6). Thus, while the real level of the aggregate trust 
fund balance declined sharply, the potential volume of 
claims increased. Combined, these developments meant that 
the benefit cushion in the trust fund declined very 
dramatically over this time period. Column 7 expresses this 
cushion, as measured in column 5, as the fraction of annual 
covered employment that could be compensated by the ex 
isting trust fund. It fell from .572 to .056 during these 32 
years. Thus, the ability of state UI programs to provide com 
pensation benefits without immediate resort to higher 
employer taxes or emergency loans has declined in a 
precipitous manner over the post-World War II period. The 
real trust fund benefit cushion at the end of 1979 was about 
one-tenth of its 1948 level.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of table 1-1 is the 
steady downtrend in the trust fund reserve position as in 
dicated in columns 2 and 7. The only noticeable slowdown in 
the long term downtrend occurred between 1959 and 1969. 
Most of this decade was characterized by steady and substan 
tial economic growth. Even though the 1959 reserves had
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been depleted by the 1958 recession, they still were somewhat 
more adequate than reserves 10 years later. If the 1969 ag 
gregate trust fund balance was adequate, the 1979 balance 
clearly was not. The small cushion represented by the 1979 
trust fund has been a major contributing factor behind the 
recent loans and the current indebtedness of the state UI pro 
grams.
With the full benefit of hindsight, it can be inferred that 
trust fund balances in the late 1940s were excessive for the 
needs of the program. Two ways to reduce excessive balances 
were through experience rated tax reductions and not raising 
the taxable wage base. After UI trust funds became depleted 
in the 1970s, it has not always been easy for states to raise 
employer taxes. One can speculate that the earlier situation 
of excess reserves followed by downward tax adjustments 
did not serve the UI system well when it later became 
necessary to increase average tax rates and tax bases.
Reasonable people may disagree in defining an adequate 
level of state UI trust fund reserves. Factors such as the 
average or usual level of state unemployment, the level and 
availability of benefits to the unemployed and the severity of 
a given recession are all relevant in assessing trust fund ade 
quacy. One measure of adequacy has been developed by a 
committee of the Interstate Conference of Employment 
Security Agencies (ICESA). Their guideline involves a com 
parison of the trust fund reserve to the highest total of 
benefits for a 12-month period with each expressed as a pro 
portion or ratio of total covered wages. The 12-month high 
benefit cost ratio is based on total payrolls for the period of 
those costs (or a year close to that period) while the reserve 
ratio is based on payrolls for the latest period. The reserve 
ratio is expressed as a multiple of the benefit cost ratio and is 
to be between 1.5 and 3.0. Under this guideline, a multiple of 
1.5 (representing 18 months of benefits paid in an environ-
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ment of unusually high unemployment) can be termed a 
minimum adequate level of reserves.
Table 1-2 presents detail on the distribution of reserve 
ratio multiples for 51 jurisdictions (the 50 states plus the 
District of Columbia) in 1969, 1973 and 1979. Also shown 
are medians of the 51 state multiples and multiples based on 
aggregate U.S. data. The table shows that most of the 1969 
multiples exceeded the guideline. Thirty-five were 1.5 or 
larger and 15 of the remaining 16 fell between 1.00 and 1.49. 
The only state with a ratio below 1.0 was Michigan. In 1973, 
21 state multiples exceeded 1.5 while 18 were less than 1.0. 
Of the 18, however, note that just 4 state ratios fell below 
.50. By 1979, only 2 state ratios exceeded 1.5 while 9 were 
negative and another 29 fell between 0 and .99. Using the 1.5 
reserve ratio multiple guideline, the state systems went from 
a situation of at least minimum fund adequacy in 35 jurisdic 
tions down to just 2 jurisdictions between 1969 and 1979.
For many states, the 1979 reserve ratio multiples in table 
1-2 utilize data on benefit costs from the 1974-75 recession. 
Since that recession was unusually long and severe, it is in 
structive to note the distribution of reserve ratio multiples 
based on pre-1974 benefit cost experiences. The bottom line 
in the table shows these ratios for 1979.Although they are 
larger in several states, only 5 equal or exceed 1.5 while 31 
are still smaller than 1.0. Thus, widespread reserve inade 
quacy is still present even when benefit experiences from 
pre-1974 recessions are used in the reserve ratio multiple 
calculations.
Based on the preceding, two broad statements about state 
UI trust fund balances can be made. (1) Aggregate data 
show clearly that between 1948 and 1979 the program evolv 
ed from a situation of trust fund overabundance to inade 
quacy. The measure of fund adequacy developed in column 
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employment, reached a level in 1979 that was about one- 
tenth the size of its 1948 level. The critical period in this 
evolution was the years following 1969 when state reserve 
ratio multiples fell to levels that were generally below a sug 
gested actuarial standard of 1.5. (2) The decline in trust fund 
reserves has been widespread and not confined to just a few 
states. Using the 1.5 minimum reserve ratio multiple 
guideline, the number of jurisdictions with inadequate trust 
fund reserves increased from 16 in 1969 to 49 in 1979. 
Widespread deficits, emergency federal loans and large debts 
are all direct consequences of inadequate state UI program 
funding.
Because funding has been inadequate, most UI programs 
have had to borrow at least once in the past decade. Of the 
51 "states," i.e., the 50 plus the District of Columbia, 23 
borrowed sometime in the 1970s while 32 borrowed 
sometime between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1984. 
Altogether 38 different states have borrowed at least once 
between 1972 and December 1984. 7 Over these 13 years a 
total of $23.4 billion was lent to insolvent state UI programs.
Although the present study focuses primarily on state fund 
insolvency and debt, one has to recognize the diversity of in 
dividual state experiences. Several states have never become 
insolvent while others have borrowed only relatively small 
amounts for brief periods. The programs that have been suc 
cessful in avoiding major funding problems are examined in 
chapter 3. Despite the diversity of state experiences, it must 
be emphasized that the loss of fund adequacy has been a per 
vasive phenomenon. Only two states entered the 1980s with 
reserve ratio multiples of at least 1.5. Even after all UI in 
debtedness is eliminated, it will require substantial additional 
trust fund rebuilding to achieve a distribution of reserve 
ratio multiples approaching that which existed at the end of 
1969. In other words, a long-run solvency problem will con 
tinue to exist even after all current indebtedness has been 
eliminated.
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Trust Fund Insolvency and Debt
Table 1-3 displays aggregate annual data on loan activities 
and indebtedness since 1969. Columns 1 and 2 respectively 
show the start-of-year trust fund position of the programs 
(more precisely the reserve ratio multiple) and the annual 
unemployment rate for the civilian labor force. Because the 
1974-75 recession followed closely after the 1970-71 
downturn, very little trust fund rebuilding occurred in 1972 
and 1973. As a consequence, benefit payments associated 
with the very high unemployment rates of 1975-77 caused a 
precipitous decline in the aggregate reserve ratio multiple 
and loans were required by many state UI programs. Loans 
of $4.5 billion were made in 1975-77 and for the entire 
1972-79 period the total was $5.5 billion. Substantial loan 
repayments occurred in 1979, but $3.7 billion of debt re 
mained at the end of that year as the economy entered 
another major recessionary period.
The recession of 1980 seriously impacted state UI pro 
grams whose trust funds were even more depleted than they 
had been in 1974-75. About $3.1 billion was borrowed in 
1980-81. When unemployment then rose to even higher levels 
in 1982 and 1983, annual loans of $5.2 billion and $6.6 
billion were required. More than half (27) of the state UI 
programs had to borrow in 1983. With practically nonexis 
tent trust fund cushions large benefit payouts meant an im 
mediate need for federal loans. State borrowing in 1983 
equaled about one-third of all benefit payments made under 
regular state UI and EB programs.
The year 1983 was noteworthy not only for the amount of 
loans but also for the volume of loan repayments. The $3.9 
billion of repayments was nearly three times the amount 
repaid in 1979, the second highest previous repayment year. 
A heavy volume of loan repayments occurred despite the fact 
that 1983 was a year of serious recession. Loan repayments
Table 1-3 



























































































































































SOURCE: Data in columns (1), (6) and (7) taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Column (2) 
taken from U.S. Executive Office of the President, Economic Report of the President (1984). Columns (4) and (5) are based on unpublished






plus the District of Columbia.
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totaling $6.8 billion took place in 1984. Since the recent 
loans are interest-bearing, debtor states have been repaying 
them at a particularly rapid rate. Over 80 percent of total 
loan repayments in both 1983 and 1984 were made on 
interest-bearing debt. In contrast, loan repayments were of 
minor importance during 1975-77, the years of highest 
unemployment during the 1970s. Because of these recent 
repayments end-of-year indebtedness grew by only $2.7 
billion (from $10.6 to $13.3 billion) between 1982 and 1983, 
while it declined by about $3.8 billion between 1983 and 
1984. To better understand why large repayments occurred 
in a year of such high unemployment it will be useful to 
describe the repayment provisions of the federal laws, the 
costs of indebtedness and how these costs have increased in 
the 1980s.
Repayment of loans by the states can be made in two 
ways. (1) States can make voluntary payments from their 
trust fund accounts to the federal loan account. 
(2) Employers in debtor states may be subject to increased 
taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax. As noted 
earlier, the basic net FUT rate is .8 percent. For states with 
outstanding loans, however, the FUT net rate is automatical 
ly raised by predetermined amounts and the proceeds are us 
ed to repay debts. These higher taxes can be termed FUT 
penalty taxes.
Penalty taxes are applied after a state loan has been 
outstanding on January 1 of two consecutive years. The 
penalty tax rate is .3 percent of federally taxable payroll in 
the first year of applicability and it rises by increments of .3 
percent in subsequent years8 until the outstanding loan is ful 
ly repaid. (The FUT rate increases are really reductions in the 
amount of the tax credit allowed. Thus, the full tax offset of 
2.7 percent prior to 1985 was reduced to 2.4, then to 2.1, and 
so on. After 1984, the full offset of 5.4 percent is reduced to 
5.1, 4.8, etc.). Connecticut was the first state to need federal
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loans (March 1972 was the first loan date), and its employers 
were subject to a .3 percent PUT penalty tax payable in 1975 
(based on 1974 taxable wages).
Altogether, a total of 23 different states secured loans in 
the 1970s, but only 7 actually paid penalty taxes prior to 
1980. 9 Full implementation of the penalty tax provisions was 
twice deferred by legislation during the 1970s. Because it was 
viewed as inappropriate to impose penalty taxes in a period 
of high unemployment and low employer profits, federal 
amendments of the repayment provisions were enacted in 
1975 (PL94-45) and 1977 (PL95-19) that deferred until 1978 
and then until 1980 the full applicability of the penalty tax 
provisions. The loans made during the 1970s were not finan 
cially onerous for the debtor states for another reason. There 
were no interest charges on the outstanding debt.
Individual debtor states followed a variety of policies in 
repaying the loans. By the end of 1979, 12 of the 23 that had 
borrowed had completely paid off their loans by transfer 
from their reserve accounts, and 2 more completed their debt 
repayments during 1980. 10 Although 12 of the 23 debtor 
states had fully repaid their loans by the end of 1979, about 
two-thirds of the principal ($3.7 of $5.5 billion) remained 
outstanding. Of the $3.7 billion debt, $3.2 billion was con 
centrated in just four states (Connecticut - $.4 billion; 
Illinois - $.9 billion; New Jersey - $.7 billion; and 
Pennsylvania - $1.2 billion). Besides these states, the other 
five that continued in debt past 1980 were Delaware, the 
District of Columbia, Maine, Rhode Island and Vermont. 
These states did little or nothing to repay their loans, even 
though the bulk of the lending occurred prior to 1978. 11 
Because of inflation, each year of repayment deferral reduc 
ed the real burden of their indebtedness.
The failure of some debtor states to make substantial loan 
repayments in the late 1970s was an important consideration
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in subsequent federal legislative actions. First, a further 
deferral of PUT penalty taxes was not seriously considered in 
1979 and the penalty took effect in nine states in 1980. The 
dollar amount of FUT penalty taxes rose from $60 million in 
1979 to over $300 million in 1980. 12 Second, the Reagan Ad 
ministration in 1981 proposed that future loans would carry 
interest charges. This proposal was adopted as part of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of August 1981 
(PL97-35). New loans made after March 31, 1982 carry an 
annual interest charge if not fully repaid within the same 
fiscal year. Interest was charged on the average outstanding 
loan balance, and the interest rate was the same as the rate 
paid on state UI trust fund investments (but subject to a 
maximum rate of 10 percent per year). 13 Combined, these in 
terest and FUT penalty applications meant that future loans 
would be more expensive and debt repayment would be more 
prompt. 14
The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act also con 
tained provisions to limit FUT penalty taxes. Four solvency 
requirements were listed that, if met by a state, could limit 
the penalty taxes applicable during the years 1981 to 1987. 
The four requirements were: (1) to maintain unemployment 
tax effort; (2) not to reduce net solvency in the program; 
(3) to have the tax rate (based on total wages) at least equal 
the prior five-year average benefit cost rate; and (4) to avoid 
increases in total indebtedness after 1981. 15 The last two re 
quirements were applicable starting in 1983. States could 
limit FUT penalty taxes in 1981 and 1982 merely by not 
lowering employer taxes and not raising benefits or easing 
benefit eligibility. The FUT penalty rate was limited to .6 
percent or to the pre-1981 rate if it exceeded .6 percent. Since 
FUT penalty taxes are payable in January of the year after 
they accrue, this legislation meant that a .6 percent penalty 
tax was levied in eight states in January 1982 and only in 
Connecticut was it higher.
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The economic downturn of 1981-82, however, led to a 
renewed concern about the financial problems confronting 
debtor states. As unemployment increased in late 1981 and 
throughout 1982, it became clear that the higher costs of 
debt repayment would be experienced while the states were in 
the midst of a very severe recession. The Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (PL97-248, also known as 
TEFRA) contained provisions designed to lessen recession- 
induced economic hardships both for workers with long term 
unemployment and for state UI programs with financing 
problems. A program of Federal Supplemental Compensa 
tion (FSC) was created to provide extra weeks of long term 
benefits to workers exhausting their regular state UI or EB 
entitlements. 16
Important TEFRA provisions focused on financing and 
debt repayment issues. (1) The Federal Unemployment Tax 
was modified in several ways. Starting in 1983, the taxable 
wage base was raised from $6,000 to $7,000 per covered 
workers and the net tax rate was increased from .7 to .8 per 
cent of taxable wages. Also the gross federal UI tax rate was 
raised from 3.5 to 6.2 percent starting in 1985. This change 
doubles the maximum credit allowed employers for state UI 
taxes from 2.7 to 5.4 percent since the net FUT rate remains 
at .8. State tax rates may not be less than 5.4 except through 
experience rating and maximum state tax rates still less than 
5.4 will have to rise to at least that level.
(2) Starting in 1983, debtor states could avoid FUT penal 
ty taxes for their employers. To avoid these taxes, a state 
must (i) repay current year advances before November 10, 
(ii) pay from its reserves an amount toward reducing its prior 
debt equivalent to the potential penalty taxes, (iii) have a 
trust fund balance on November 1 equal to at least three 
months worth of benefits and (iv) enact a net increase in pro 
gram solvency. Wisconsin, for example, which first obtained 
loans in 1982, will be able to avoid FUT penalty taxes in 1985
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because it satisfies these four TEFRA financial re 
quirements. 17
Other TEFRA financial provisions were as follows. (3) It 
limited the potentially sharp increases in FUT penalty taxes 
(much larger than .3 percent) applicable after several years in 
debtor states that had not improved the financial solvency of 
their programs. (4) States with very high insured unemploy 
ment rates (lURs) were allowed to defer up to three-fourths 
of their annual interest payment due after the end of 1982. 
The deferred amounts were to be repaid in the subsequent 
three years and to accrue interest while they remained un 
paid. The threshold IUR was 7.5 percent, a rate so high that 
only Michigan©s rate for the first six months of 1982 exceed 
ed this level.
An examination of these TEFRA financial provisions 
shows they were intended both to improve overall state UI 
program solvency and to provide partial financial relief to 
some debtor states. Improved program solvency would result 
in some states from the tax base increase in 1983, the higher 
gross FUT tax rate in 1985 and from inducements for states 
to enact legislation. Penalty taxes could be avoided if solven 
cy was improved. Avoidance of penalty taxes by paying the 
equivalent from the state fund permits the state to finance 
the repayment through an experience rated rather than a flat 
rate tax.
Because unemployment continued to rise throughout 
1982, the volume of new loans rose sharply and exceeded $5 
billion for the year. States faced the obvious prospect of high 
interest charges in 1983 and later years. In fact, since market 
interest rates remained high throughout 1982, it was ap 
parent that interest payments would become increasingly 
burdensome. The legislation of 1981 and 1982 gave the states 
the ability to limit their FUT penalty taxes, but they could 
not reduce their interest payments. In states with large debts,
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interest charges would soon exceed PUT penalty taxes, and 
high unemployment meant that increased borrowing was in 
evitable. The partial financial relief provided to Michigan 
with its unusually high IUR was not available to other states 
and even that relief had its price, i.e., interest accrued on the 
deferred interest payments.
The Social Security Amendments of March 1983 
(PL98-21) contained provisions that addressed the costs of 
UI loans and indebtedness. For debtor state UI programs, 
interest and debt repayment terms were made potentially 
easier. If a debtor state maintained its tax effort and increas 
ed its net solvency in 1983 (or the first year of indebtedness) 
through tax increases and/or benefit reductions by 25 per 
cent (and then by more in subsequent years), it would be 
allowed during fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985 to defer un 
til later years at no cost 80 percent of the interest payments 
on federal loans made after March 31, 1982. 18 Interest defer 
rals would also be allowed if taxes as a percent of a total 
payroll equaled or exceeded 2 percent in calendar year 1982. 
Only two debtor states were eligible under this alternative in 
terest deferral criterion: Rhode Island and West Virginia.
A second financial inducement to improve net solvency 
was provided in the form of potentially lower interest rates. 
If net solvency was improved by 50 percent in 1983 (or the 
first year of indebtedness), the state would be eligible for a 1 
percentage point reduction in the interest rate charged on 
interest-bearing debt, e.g., from 10 to 9 percent for 1982 
loans. 19
The 1983 Social Security Amendments also addressed the 
potential costs of PUT penalty taxes. The four solvency re 
quirements listed in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1981 were again introduced as criteria for limiting these 
taxes. In this 1983 legislation, however, any state satisfying 
all four requirements would be eligible for a permanent cap
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(as opposed to a temporary cap lasting only until 1987) on 
FUT penalty taxes. Also, criteria were listed for reducing an 
nual increments in penalty tax rates (to .1 or .2 percent per 
year) in states where some but not all of the four re 
quirements were met. 20 All of these provisions have the ef 
fect of allowing states to reduce and/or defer the financial 
obligations associated with their debts.
By charging interest on new loans, the federal government 
has provided the states with strong financial incentives to 
repay outstanding debts. If debts are repaid quickly, i.e., in 
the year that they are incurred, interest charges can be com 
pletely avoided. Voluntary repayments can be applied to 
interest-bearing debt even if the state has older debt incurred 
before April 1, 1982. The repayment activities of 1983 and 
1984 previously noted in table 1-3 reflect this repayment 
behavior. Between April 1, 1982 and December 31, 1983, for 
example, new loans totaled $10.1 billion but only $6.4 billion 
was still outstanding at the end of 1983. As noted, loan 
repayments in the first nine months of 1984 totaled $5.9 
billion. Compared to earlier periods, this is a very rapid rate 
of repayment, particularly considering that 1983-84 have 
been years of very high unemployment.
The interest costs and FUT penalty taxes when coupled 
with the potential financial relief provided by the 1983 Social 
Security Amendments give debtor states very strong in 
ducements to modify their UI laws. Following the Amend 
ments, legislation has been enacted or at least proposed in 
nearly all states with large debts. Chapter 2 will examine 
these legislative initiatives in some detail. Before moving on 
to the specifics of the changes, however, there are 
background issues regarding the origins of the funding crisis 
that need to be addressed.
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Origins of the Funding Problem
The funding problem that state UI programs are currently 
experiencing has origins in the recent overall performance of 
the economy. Adverse economic developments coupled with 
key revenue and benefit features of UI programs have 
resulted in a persistent tendency for benefit payouts to ex 
ceed revenues since 1969. Four developments will be examin 
ed in subsequent paragraphs: (1) real GNP growth; 
(2) regional growth differentials; (3) recent inflation and 
(4) the Federal-State Extended Benefit (EB) program. All 
four have contributed to the funding problem.
Variations in Real GNP Growth Rates
Table 1-4 presents summary data on U.S. macroeconomic 
performance between 1949 and 1983. The starting point, 
1949, is the year of the first post-World War II recession and 
a year when state UI programs had abundant, perhaps 
overabundant, trust fund reserves. Indicators in the table are 
organized roughly by decade with the exact time periods be 
ing 1949-59, 1960-69, 1970-79 and 1980-83. Although most 
are long time intervals, they do illustrate important contrasts 
in economic performance. The aggregate of state trust fund 
balances at the start of these four periods can be characteriz 
ed respectively as overabundant, adequate, inadequate, and 
very inadequate. The aggregate reserve position, net of 
loans, declined sharply during the 1949-59 and the 1970-79 
periods.
Annual rates of growth in the economy©s output of final 
goods and services (real GNP) averaged just above 3 percent 
in the 1950s and 1970s, more than 1 full percentage point 
below the 4.6 percent average of the 1960s. The latter period 
had just one recession (1960-61) and a prolonged period of 
economic growth between 1961 and 1969. Due to two reces 
sions (1980 and 1981-82) the 1980-83 period had very low 
real growth.
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Table 1-4
Economic Performance and State UI Net Trust Fund Reserves 
U.S. and Region, 1949-1983
1949-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-83
Indicator3 and region** Annual averages
Real GNP growth rate 3.4 4.6 3.3 .7
Unemployment rate
All persons 16 and older 4.6 4.8 6.2 8.5 
Men 25 and older 3.6 3.1 3.6 6.3
Real labor productivity 






















Start of period net UI trust fund reserves 
















SOURCES: Rates of GNP and labor productivity (output per man hour) growth and infla 
tion (implicit price deflator for GNP) based on national income accounts data (for nonfarm 
business sector) from U.S. Executive Office of the President, Economic Report of the 
President (1984), table B-41, p. 267.
Unemployment rates based on monthly household survey and employment growth rates 
on the establishment survey. Data taken from Employment and Earnings (May 1984), pp. 
128/151 and earlier U.S. Department of Labor Publications.
Trust fund reserves and payrolls data from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment 
Insurance Financial Data (1984).
a. Economic performance indicators are measured as percentage changes and averaged 
over the indicated period; UI trust fund reserves are measured at the start of each period 
and expressed as a percentage of total covered payrolls in the previous year, 
b. The "North" region includes states in the North East and North Central divisions as 
defined by the Census Bureau; the "South and West" includes all other states.
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The effects of economic recessions are apparent not only 
in economic growth rates, but also in the average unemploy 
ment rates. Because high unemployment leads to increased 
demand for UI benefits, average unemployment rates have 
obvious implications for UI trust fund payouts. Since World 
War II the composition of U.S. unemployment has 
undergone a long run change with an increasing share of the 
total made up of younger persons and women, groups whose 
unemployment rates are typically higher than the rates ex 
perienced by adult men. This changing mix has tended to in 
crease the economy©s average unemployment rate in more re 
cent years and to increase the minimum unemployment rate 
consistent with a full employment economy. 21 Table 1-4 il 
lustrates the importance of this mix effect by displaying two 
sets of average unemployment rates; the rate for all persons 
16 and older and the rate for adult men 25 and older. The 
adult male unemployment rate, which is more comparable 
across time periods, clearly illustrates the economy©s 
superior performance of the 1960s in comparison to the ad 
jacent earlier and later decades. Since adult men are the 
demographic group most likely to be UI beneficiaries, 
movements in their average rate provide a useful gauge of 
the demand for UI benefits. Both average unemployment 
rates are very high in the 1980-83 period.
The data on real GNP growth rates and adult male 
unemployment rates convey similar messages. Frequent 
recessions in the 1950s and 1970s caused substantial drains 
on UI trust fund reserves. Because the system started the 
1950s with excessive reserves, however, it emerged from the 
1950s with generally adequate reserves, although 12 states 
had less than adequate reserves, including 3 in debt. Ten 
years later, aggregate reserves still seemed generally ade 
quate, but 16 states had reserve ratio multiples that fell 
below 1.5. The excessive reserve cushion from the late 1940s 
was not present at the start of the 1970s, and, as a result, the
24 The Funding Problem
recessions of this decade necessitated borrowing by many 
state UI programs. Given the low reserves and very high 
unemployment rates of 1980-83, borrowing in this latest 
period has also been widespread.
Disparities in Regional Rates of Economic Growth
Output growth translates into employment growth as in 
creased real production raises demand for labor and creates 
more jobs. The association between output growth and 
employment growth, however, is also influenced by labor 
productivity growth. For a given rate of output growth, a 
lower rate of productivity growth will imply a faster rate of 
employment growth. Table 1-4 documents the slowdown in 
labor productivity growth that occurred in the 1970s when 
average man hour productivity grew by 1.4 percent per year 
compared to averages of 2.3-2.5 percent in the preceding two 
decades. Because of the productivity slowdown average 
employment growth was nearly as fast in the 1970s as it had 
been in the 1960s, despite the slower pace of output growth. 
On average, employment grew by 2.5 percent per year in the 
1970s compared to 2.6 percent in the 1960s. Since employ 
ment growth and productivity growth are very sensitive to 
short-run business cycle developments, their slow growth in 
1980-83 reflects cyclical factors.
Over the entire period since World War II, there have been 
systematic differences in regional rates of economic growth. 
States in the South and West have consistently exhibited 
higher than average growth while states in the North have 
grown more slowly. Table 1-4 illustrates these regional dif 
ferences with data on employment growth rates. The 
cumulative effect of the employment growth differentials 
over this 34-year period is quite dramatic. In 1948, states in 
the North had 63 percent of total U.S. employment, but by 
1983 their employment share had declined to 47 percent.
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Since 1970, the differences in regional growth rates have 
been especially pronounced. The first energy crisis of 
1973-75 increased the relative costs of doing business in the 
North (so-called frost belt states) and hastened the pace of 
regional population and employment reallocations. Em 
ployment growth data in table 1-4 illustrate the increased 
regional disparities. As noted, employment growth for the 
U.S. as a whole was only .1 percent lower in the 1970s com 
pared to the 1960s. However, employment growth during the 
1970s was .7 percent lower in the North but actually .5 per 
cent higher in the South and West when compared to the 
preceding decade. These wider regional disparities have per 
sisted through the first four years of the present decade.
Given the way that UI programs are financed, increased 
regional growth disparities can have differential implications 
for trust fund balances in individual states. Consider some 
consequences of a company closing a plant in the North and 
simultaneously opening a plant in the South or West. The 
claims of laid-off workers are the obligation of the program 
in the state where the plant closure occurs. The closing will 
cause a loss of tax revenues as well as an increase in benefit 
claims. Even if the worker moves out of the state to find a 
new job, he or she can file an interstate claim that is the 
financial obligation of employers in the original state. New 
and expanding plants in the growing region pay taxes for 
new employees as soon as the workers are hired. For new 
plants, the employer taxes are not reduced by an experience 
factors so that trust fund reserves are accumulated quickly in 
the first few years of operation. New employees must work 
for a time before satisfying the monetary eligibility re 
quirements for state UI benefits. Thus, when the regional 
distribution of employment changes, there is some tendency 
for UI trust funds to be reduced in regions that are losing 
employment while at the same time they are increased in 
regions where employment is growing.
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To date there has not been a detailed study of how 
disparities in regional rates of economic growth affect state 
UI trust fund balances. It is clear from aggregate data in 
table 1-4, however, that employment growth disparities have 
been unusually wide in 1970-79 and 1980-83. It is also ob 
vious in table 1-4 that the aggregate trust fund reserves of 
states in the South and West did not deteriorate as much dur 
ing the 1970s as they did in the North. Reserves as a propor 
tion of covered wages in the two regions were roughly equal 
in 1970; .034 in the North and .035 in the South and West. 
By 1980, however, reserves in the South and West were .020 
of covered wages while the net reserve balance for the North 
as a whole was negative. In both the 1970s and in 1980-83 the 
bulk of loans to state UI programs has gone to states in the 
North.
Table 1-5 provides more detail on the regional aspect of 
state UI loan activities in the 1970s and in 1980-83. Column 1 
displays the percentage breakdown of covered wages among 
the Census Bureau©s four geographic regions and nine divi 
sions. If funding problems were randomly distributed by 
state and region, these percentages would provide a rough 
guide as to how loans would be distributed. The actual 
percentage distributions of loans are then shown in columns 
2 and 3. During the 1970s, loans were heavily concentrated in 
the North East with 17.6 and 41.5 percent going to New 
England and Middle Atlantic states respectively. Most of the 
remainder (28.4 percent) went to states in the East North 
Central division. The latter division accounted for 58.8 per 
cent of all loans in the 1980s, a reflection of the current 
recession©s severity in these heavily industrialized states. 
Thus, although states in the North were the main loan recip 
ients in both periods, loans went mainly to Northeastern 
states in the 1970s and mainly to North Central states in the 
1980s. Note also in columns 4 and 5 that per dollar of 
covered wages, New England was the largest user of loans in
Table 1-5
Federal Loans to State UI Programs 
Employment Growth and Unemployment by Region
Percent of Percent of 
















U.S. Total - percent
















































































































































































from the U.S. Department of Labor. Columns (6) and (7) which are based on annual averages from the Labor Department©s Establishment 
Survey refer to non-agricultural wage and salary employment. Unemployment rates in columns (8) and (9) are based on the Labor Department- 
Census Bureau monthly household survey of the labor force. Data in columns (6) through (9) taken from Employment and Earnings (May 
1984), pp. 128/151 and earlier U.S. Department of Labor publications.
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the 1970s but a very minor user in the 1980s. It is clear that 
funding problems are now most severe in the East North 
Central states. All five (Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois 
and Wisconsin) have had to borrow in recent years.
Employment growth rates in the various regions and divi 
sions are summarized in columns 6 and 7. As previously 
noted the South and West grew much faster than the na 
tional average in the 1970s (and, incidentally, even faster 
than their own growth rates of the 1960s) while the North 
East was the slowest growing region. The concentration of 
the 1980-83 downturn in the North Central region is in 
dicated by the negative employment growth which is 
especially large in the East North Central division (-2.2 per 
cent). Note also that New England grew faster than the na 
tional average in the 1980-83 period.
The contrasting experiences of the North East and North 
Central regions between 1970-79 and 1980-83 are also il 
lustrated by the average unemployment rates in columns 8 
and 9. During the 1970s, unemployment rates in the North 
East exceeded the national average while the East North 
Central division experienced roughly average rates. Their 
positions were exactly reversed in 1980-83 when the 
unemployment rate in the East North Central division was 
2.3 percentage points above the national average. Especially 
noticeable in this period was the low unemployment in New 
England. Its average rate was lower than during the 1970s 
and 1.8 percentage points below the national average (6.7 
versus 8.5 percent). It is clear from table 1-5 that in 1970-79 
and again in 1980-83 loans went mainly to states in regions 
with high unemployment.
Following the economic downturn of 1981-82 there have 
been sharply higher unemployment rates in the major 
energy-producing states of the South (Louisiana, Oklahoma 
and Texas) and in (coal-producing) Kentucky and West
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Virginia. For these five states, unemployment rates in 1980 
were 6.7, 4.8, 5.2, 8.0 and 9.4 percent respectively. In 1983 
the corresponding rates were 11.8, 9.0, 8.0, 11.7 and 18.0 
percent. Because of sharp increases in unemployment four of 
the five energy-producing states have recently experienced 
UI funding problems. Louisiana and Texas borrowed $1.1 
billion in 1983. Except for loans made to the State of 
Washington in the 1970s, these loans to Texas and Louisiana 
are the only large-scale advances made to states outside the 
North in either the 1970s or 1980-83. Table 1-5 shows that 
states in the West South Central division (Texas, Louisiana, 
and Arkansas) have accounted for 9.7 percent of total bor 
rowing in the 1980-83 period. Although the scale of their 
borrowing has been generally small, it should be noted that 
nine southern and eight western states have had to borrow at 
least once since 1972.
The Pacific division contrasts with others in having both 
high employment growth and high unemployment, par 
ticularly during the 1970s. The absence of large-scale bor 
rowing in this division could be evidence that high growth 
has favorable effects on state UI program financing. As 
noted above, the effects of high growth could operate either 
through the revenue side of the program, e.g., having more 
new firms contribute at a rate that exceeds their long-run 
average cost, or the benefit side, e.g., high growth leads to a 
delay in acquiring monetary eligibility and/or to less long 
term unemployment. Whatever the reason (or reasons), it is 
clear that states in the Pacific division have had fewer fund 
ing problems than states in other divisions with high 
unemployment.
The data in table 1-5 clearly show that UI trust fund prob 
lems have not occurred in a random manner across the 
economy. In both the 1970s and in 1980-83, loans have been 
concentrated in regions with high rates of unemployment 
and low rates of employment growth.
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Inflation
The economy experienced much higher inflation rates in 
the 1970s than it did in the preceding two decades. Table 1-4, 
for example, shows that annual inflation rates (as measured 
by the implicit price deflator) averaged 2.4 and 2.2 percent 
during 1949-59 and 1960-69 respectively. Average inflation 
rates were more than twice as high in 1970-79 and 1980-83 
(6.3 and 7.3 percent). The combination of both high infla 
tion and high unemployment experienced during the 1970s 
was unusual, and the term stagflation became widely used to 
describe this situation. The OPEC oil price increases of 
1973-75 and 1979-81 were an important cause for the 
economy©s stagflation.
High rates of inflation have important implications for 
state UI financing. In many programs, increased wage infla 
tion causes benefit payments to increase automatically and 
roughly by an amount that matches the higher inflation, 
while tax revenues do not keep pace. The institutional 
features of many programs that cause the asymmetric 
response are quite easy to describe. The weekly benefit max 
imum is often tied to an index of average earnings, e.g., the 
average weekly wage in manufacturing or the average for all 
covered employment. Thus, when inflation increases this is 
soon translated into higher weekly wages, a higher weekly 
benefit maximum and increased weekly benefits.
Indexation of the maximum weekly benefit became 
noticeably more widespread in the 1960s and 1970s. By 1971, 
half of the states had instituted indexation and 10 more 
followed suit later in the 1970s. In this same period there was 
a trend towards liberalizing the level of the maximum benefit 
relative to the average weekly wage. Thus, in 1971 the weekly 
benefit maximum equaled or exceeded 60 percent of the 
average weekly wage in only 8 states, but by 1983 the number 
had grown to 22. Both changes cause average weekly benefits 
to respond strongly to changes in average weekly wages.
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Benefit data from the 1960s and 1970s illustrate this re- 
sponsiveness. For the three years 1959, 1969, and 1979, 
average weekly benefits for the entire economy were $30.40, 
$46.17, and $89.68 respectively. The implied compound 
growth rate in weekly benefits over the 1960s and 1970s (4.3 
and 6.9 percent respectively) exceed the inflation rates for 
the two decades as shown in table 1-4. When measured 
relative to average weekly wages in covered employment, 
i.e., the gross replacement rate, benefits became a somewhat 
larger fraction, increasing from .334 in 1959 to .344 in 1969 
and then to .361 in 1979. During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
benefit side of UI could be described as being fully indexed. 
Thus when inflation increased sharply in the 1970s this 
meant that the financial obligation to pay benefits would 
have increased sharply even if unemployment rates of the 
1970s had been no higher than those of the 1960s.
Increasing benefit obligations would not pose financial 
problems if UI tax revenues were also fully indexed to the in 
flation rate. Each state has an annual taxable wage base per 
covered employee. In most states in most years, this max 
imum has been the same as the taxable wage base for the 
Federal Unemployment Tax (FUT). Between 1940 and 1971 
this maximum was $3,000 per worker. Because the federal 
maximum was unchanged for this long period while average 
wages were growing, taxable wages came to represent a 
smaller and smaller proportion of total wages. The ratio of 
taxable to total wages declined from .928 in 1940 to .453 in 
1971. Several states raised their taxable wage bases above the 
$3,000 federal level in the 1960s and in 1970-71. The national 
ratio of taxable to total wages in 1971 would have been even 
lower than .453 had all states retained the $3,000 wage base.
During the 1960s there was an increasing recognition that 
the FUT taxable wage base was inadequate to finance 
benefits. Thus the base was raised to $4,200 in 1972 and then 
to $6,000 in 1978. Because of higher inflation during the
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1970s, however, the ratio of taxable to total wages continued 
to decline. By 1982 taxable wages represented only .405 of 
total wages even though the wage base was twice its 1971 
level. Even with an increase to $7,000 in 1983 and to higher 
levels in several states, taxable wages continue to represent 
less than half of all wages in covered employment.
Table 1-6 presents summary data on tax bases and average 
tax rates in state UI programs since 1960. It documents the 
downtrend in the ratio of taxable to total wages (column 2) 
and shows how the increases in the PUT maximum of 1972, 
1978 and 1983 increased the ratio in those three years. Col 
umns 3 and 4 respectively show the average tax rates on tax 
able wages and total wages. In the 1970s, the average rate on 
taxable wages did rise, but the tax rate on total wages was no 
higher than it was in the early 1960s. This clearly illustrates 
the effect of the long term downtrend in the ratio of taxable 
to total wages. Although average tax rates increased follow 
ing the recessions of the 1970s, they did not increase enough 
to adequately replenish UI trust funds. Given the low taxable 
wage base per employee, even larger increases in statutory 
tax rates were needed.
Increasingly, individual states have recognized that the 
PUT taxable maximum is an inadequate base for employer 
UI taxes. Table 1-6 shows the number of states with max 
imums higher than the PUT maximum. By 1984, this number 
stood at 31. Although individual states have legislated higher 
maximums, they typically have not been set that much above 
the PUT taxable wage base. Thus, 23 states had maximums 
above $3,000 in 1971 but only 5 exceeded $4,200 in 1972. 
Note, however, after the next two tax base increases that 12 
state maximums exceeded $6,000 in 1978 and then 24 exceed 
ed $7,000 in 1983. Although 31 state maximums were above 
$7,000 in 1984, only 9 exceeded $10,000. Thus even among 
states that have legislated higher maximums there has been a 
reluctance to go too far beyond the PUT taxable maximum.
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Table 1-6 















































































































































































SOURCES: Based on data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment In 
surance Financial Data (1984). Average tax rates in column (3) were computed at The Ur 
ban Institute. Data for 1983 are preliminary, 
a. This column refers to the 50 states plus the District of Columbia. 
NA = not available.
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One obvious way to increase the responsiveness of UI 
taxes to inflation is to index the taxable wage base. Hawaii 
indexed its wage base in 1965 and several other states follow 
ed suit in the mid-1970s. Typically, the tax base is set to a 
specific percentage, say 67 or 100 percent, of the state©s 
average wage in the previous (calendar or fiscal) year. By 
1984 there were 14 states with taxable wage bases indexed to 
average wages. All nine states with tax bases above $10,000 
in 1984 were states where the tax base was indexed. It is clear 
that indexing has led to larger increases in the tax base than 
have periodic legislated increases. In chapter 3 we will review 
the performance of states that have indexed their taxable 
wage bases to determine if they had less serious trust fund 
problems in the 1970s and 1980s when compared to the 
average experience of other states.
Considering the financing difficulties that state UI pro 
grams have had since 1970, it seems that stagflation poses 
especially serious problems. In a period of stagflation total 
benefit payments increase both because high unemployment 
raises weeks compensated and because inflation raises 
average weekly benefits. To the extent that the taxable wage 
base is fixed in nominal terms, most of the revenue ad 
justments must take the form of higher employer tax rates. 
In the aggregate, employer tax rates were not raised suffi 
ciently in the 1970s and in 1980-83 to prevent the need for 
large scale U.S. Treasury loans. High inflation since 1969 
has clearly played a role in the state UI funding problem.
The Costs of Extended Benefits
The Federal-State Extended Benefit (EB) program was 
enacted in 1970 (PL91-373) to provide up to 13 extra weeks 
of benefits to exhaustees during recessions. A set of trigger 
mechanisms was specified that would activate EB payments 
whenever state and/or national insured unemployment rates 
exceeded predetermined thresholds. 22 Benefits were first
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available in 1971, and they have been paid in every year since 
1971.
The costs of the EB program are a shared federal-state 
responsibility with each paying for half of the total. The 
federal share of EB costs was originally projected to be 
covered by a .1 percent Federal Unemployment Tax con 
tribution rate in 1970 and 1971 and then a .05 percent rate in 
later years. To cover the other half of EB costs, states were 
to tax employers using whatever method they desired. Some 
states have levied a flat rate tax, while others have experience 
rated EB costs.
In practice, EB has proven more costly than originally an 
ticipated. Between 1971 and 1976 the federal half of EB costs 
totaled $3.4 billion while cumulative 1970-76 EB taxes were 
only about $1 billion. 23 The deficit in the federal share of EB 
costs was made up by borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. To 
repay these Treasury advances a "temporary" increase of .2 
percent in the FUT tax rate was imposed in 1977 and has 
been in effect in all subsequent years. 24
Financing the state share of EB costs has been difficult in 
several states. The initial federal actuarial cost projections, 
as reflected in the FUT tax rate increase of 1970, were so low 
that most states did not change their existing tax schedules. 
Raising UI tax rates is often controversial and difficult to ac 
complish, and in many states it was easier to avoid conflicts 
by retaining existing tax schedules. The impacts of high in 
flation and the subsequent recessions (with attendent in 
creases in long duration unemployment) meant that a 
substantial new dollar volume of claims on state trust fund 
accounts resulted from the EB program.
The state share of EB costs has contributed to the volume 
of UI loans in the 1970s and 1980s. Employer EB-related 
contributions are a part of UI taxes in each state and extend-
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ed benefit payments are debited either to individual 
employer accounts or to a noncharged benefits account. 25 
Large outlays for the state share of EB costs cause state trust 
funds to be drawn down in exactly the same manner as 
payments of regular state UI benefits. The cumulative state 
share of EB costs between 1971 and 1983 was $7.7 billion. 
Although there are no published estimates on the cumulative 
amount of state taxes earmarked to pay for EB, they certain 
ly have been much less than the $7.7 billion of benefit 
payments. Thus, because of EB, deficits in state trust fund 
accounts between 1971 and 1983 have been larger than they 
would have been in the absence of this program.
Although EB payments undoubtedly have helped relieve 
economic hardships among the long term unemployed, it is 
now clear that the program was created just as state UI was 
entering a period of heavy demand for benefits. No major 
new additions to state UI taxes were mandated, and the new 
federal taxes mandated in 1970 were clearly inadequate to 
meet the federal share of actual EB costs. As a result EB 
payments have helped contribute to the UI funding problems 
recently experienced by several states. 26
Reviewing the four factors discussed above it does not 
seem surprising that a state UI funding problem emerged in 
the 1970s and has been even more severe in 1980-83. High 
unemployment, uneven regional growth rates, high inflation 
and unexpected costs of EB all have contributed to the recent 
tendency for benefit outlays to exceed revenues in state UI. 
The severity of the funding problem has varied widely from 
one state to the next. Chapter 2 will examine debtor state ex 
periences and recent adjustments in some detail. Part of 
chapter 3 will focus on how some states have been able to 
avoid funding problems. Before descending to the level of in 
dividual state experiences, however, it will be useful to brief 
ly review recent developments on the benefit side of state UI 
programs.
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Benefit Payments Since 1970
State UI funding problems could originate from 
developments in program benefits or revenues or both. Table 
1-7 presents national data useful for assessing aggregate 
benefit payments. Benefit data appear for three long periods 
(1949-59, 1960-69 and 1970-79) and annually for the years 
1970 to 1983. Aggregate benefits as a percentage of total 
payroll (benefit cost rates), were very similar in the 1950s and 
1970s (1.17 and 1.15 percent respectively). 27 Slow growth due 
to frequent recessions in these decades contributed to a 
benefit cost rate that was considerably higher than during the 
1960s.
Columns 2-5 then focus on four factors that are important 
in determining benefit payments. Besides the economy©s 
overall unemployment rate, there are three ratios (insured- 
to-total unemployment, weekly beneficiaries-to-insured 
unemployment, and weekly benefits-to-average weekly 
wages) to be considered. Variations in these four factors 
cause changes in aggregate benefit outlays with increases in 
any one causing benefit payments to be higher. Growth in 
the three ratios would suggest that UI programs were becom 
ing more generous either in terms of benefit availability to 
the unemployed (columns 3 and 4) or the size of weekly 
benefits (column 5). Column 6 combines the (product of the) 
three ratios into an overall benefits index.
Unemployment rates have already been discussed. The 
average rate was higher in the 1970s than in the 1960s and 
very high in the 1980-83 period. There is a clear positive 
association between the annual data in columns 1 and 2.
Of the three components in the overall benefits index, the 
ratio of weekly benefits-to-weekly wages (often referred to as 
the gross replacement rate) demonstrates a clear upward 
trend. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the three-decade 
averages were .335, .346 and .364 respectively. This ratio has
Table 1-7 

































































































































































SOURCES: Data in columns (1), (4) and (5) taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Column 
(2) is based on the household labor force survey. Column (3) based on UI program data and household labor force data. Column (6) is the pro 
duct of columns (3), (4) and (5). Data for 1983 are preliminary 
a. Benefit outlays as percent of total covered payrolls.
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both a trend and a cyclical component. It rises in recessions 
as more experienced and high wage persons enter the pool of 
beneficiaries. 28 From column 5 it is clear that weekly benefits 
in 1980-83 are more generous relative to weekly wages than 
they were two decades earlier. Note also, however, that this 
replacement rate was not noticeably higher in 1982-83 than it 
had been in 1975-76. It may be that the replacement has 
peaked in the early 1980s. 29
Insured unemployment includes regular state UI 
beneficiaries and claimants who are not yet collecting 
benefits, e.g., those serving a waiting period and some per 
sons whose claims are in dispute. It excludes persons receiv 
ing EB, those who have exhausted benefits and persons who 
do not apply. If waiting periods were becoming shorter, the 
ratio of weekly beneficiaries-to-insured unemployment 
would rise. From table 1-7, however, it is clear there is no up 
ward trend in this ratio. If anything, it declined somewhat in 
the 1970s in comparison to previous decades. This ratio also 
has a cyclical component so that increases in 1980 and 1982 
are normal cyclical occurrences reflecting the increased 
average duration of claimants in benefit status.
The second obvious trend in the three ratios is the decline 
in the ratio of insured-to-total unemployment (column 3). 
Averages for the three decades were .498, .426 and .413 
respectively. The downtrend is the result of many influences 
among which the changing demographic mix of unemploy 
ment is undoubtedly the most important. Younger persons 
and women have come to represent an increasing share of 
total unemployment. Since they are less likely to collect UI 
benefits than are adult men, this changing mix has caused the 
ratio of insured to total unemployment to decline.
This ratio also has a strong cyclical element. In recession, 
layoffs cause the mix of unemployment to change and job 
losers become a larger share of total unemployment. Since
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they are the group most likely to collect benefits, this com 
positional change raises the ratio of insured-to-total 
unemployment. Between 1973 and 1975 the ratio increased 
from .374 to .503 and it also increased between 1979 and 
1980.
An interesting research question has arisen regarding the 
behavior of insured unemployment since 1979. Regression 
analyses by Burtless (1983) and by Vroman (1984) have 
shown that insured unemployment has been lower than ex 
pected since 1979 and that the gap between insured and total 
unemployment grew successively larger in each year between 
1980 and 1983. Note in table 1-7 that the column 3 ratio fell 
in 1981 and rose only modestly in 1982 despite the large in 
crease in unemployment of that year. The ratio then fell 
sharply in 1983 even though the total unemployment rate 
was virtually unchanged from 1982. Contributing to the re 
cent reductions in insured unemployment have been changes 
in UI laws and administrative practices as well as the 
unusually high level of benefit exhaustions since 1979.
Although it seems likely that state UI funding problems 
have contributed to recent declines in the ratio of insured-to- 
total unemployment, this has yet to be conclusively 
demonstrated by careful research. One effect of the recent 
reductions in this ratio, of course, is to lower total UI benefit 
outlays in 1980-83. 30 A second element of reduced benefit 
availability is lower amounts of EB payments since 1981. 
Because of Reagan Administration changes in EB triggers 
these payments for long-term joblessness have been much 
lower, particularly in 1982-83.
The overall benefits index combines movements in the 
three ratios to produce a summary measure. The index was 
no higher in 1970-79 than it had been in 1960-69, and both 
were lower than the average index for the 1950s. The effects 
of the gradual rise in the replacement rate were more than
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offset by the decline in the ratio of insured-to-total 
unemployment. Also note that the overall index was actually 
lower in 1982 than in 1975, and that the 1983 index is the 
lowest of any since 1970, more evidence that UI benefits 
have not been increasing relative to historic norms. Thus the 
high benefit payout rate observed since 1970 (column 1) has 
been due to higher unemployment and not to increased 
availability and generosity of UI benefits.
Summary
The state UI funding problem documented in the first part 
of this chapter has origins predominantly in high unemploy 
ment during 1970-79 and 1980-83, coupled with an insuffi 
ciently responsive revenue system. Also contributing to the 
funding problem have been unusually wide variations in 
regional growth rates, inflation and increased financial 
obligations posed by the EB program. Although borrowing 
has been widespread, even larger deficits would have been in 
curred in the 1980-83 period if there had not been recent 
reductions in insured unemployment (and associated regular 
state UI benefits) and cutbacks in EB payments.
NOTES
1. This amount refers to the debt arising from the payment of regular 
state UI benefits and the state share (half) of federal-state Extended 
Benefits or EB. Deficits in the Extended Unemployment Compensation 
Account (EUCA), a federal UI trust fund account used to pay the federal 
share of Extended Benefit costs and other temporary long-term benefits 
provided during 1971-73 and 1975-77, also gave rise to borrowing by this 
account from the U.S. Treasury. At the end of 1983 the EUCA debt was 
$6.2 billion making a total debt of $19.5 billion for the entire federal- 
state system of UI programs. Because the EUCA debt is gradually being 
repaid by earmarked federal payroll taxes, this component of in 
debtedness will not be examined in the present report.
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2. The federal-state unemployment insurance system was established as 
the result of the Social Security Act of 1935 (PL 74-271). The Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act of 1939 (PL 76-379) details the federal payroll 
tax incorporating federal UI financing provisions that were originally in 
the Social Security Act. For one description of state UI see chapter 13 in 
Myers (1981).
3. For one concise description of UI financing provisions for the period 
from 1935 to 1978, see the Appendix in Mackin (1978). In addition to 
taxing employers, four states (Alabama, Alaska, New Jersey and Penn 
sylvania) also levied taxes on covered employees in 1984.
4. If a state maximum tax rate is lower, employers at that maximum 
receive less than the full offset since that maximum rather than ex 
perience determines their rate.
5. One of the federal trust fund accounts is the federal loan fund from 
which states with depleted reserves may borrow to continue to pay 
benefits.
6. There are 53 state UI programs in the United States, those in the 50 
states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. 
The latter two jurisdictions will be excluded from the analysis of the pre 
sent report.
7. Prior to 1972, federal loans had been made to just three state UI pro 
grams. During the 1950s and early 1960s, loans were made to Alaska, 
Michigan, and Pennsylvania. These loans were fully repaid by the late 
1960s.
8. Increments of .3 percent apply strictly in the first two years that PUT 
penalty taxes are paid by a debtor state. Provisions determining further 
increments after the second year have changed more than once. In 1984, 
for example, a debtor state may have a third year penalty tax rate of .6, 
.7, .8 or .9 percent.
9. Seven different states experienced a .3 percent FUT penalty tax rate 
for a single year. The states and years were as follows; 1974-Connecticut, 
1976-Washington, 1977-Vermont, 1978-District of Columbia and Rhode 
Island, and 1979-Delaware and Pennsylvania. Penalty taxes are due in 
January of the year following the year to which they apply.
10. The 12 were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon and 
Washington. Massachusetts and Montana completed their debt 
repayments in 1980.
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11. In fact, not one of the four with the largest debts passed comprehen 
sive legislation to improve the fiscal balance in their UI program prior to 
1980. New Jersey, which did raise average employer tax rates in 1977-79 
and indexed its taxable wages base in 1976, made small voluntary 
repayments in 1978 and 1979 and Connecticut did so in each year from 
1976 to 1979. All of these repayments, however, were made in lieu of 
PUT penalty taxes and were not truly voluntary repayments.
12. Actual payment of PUT penalty taxes takes place at the end of 
January in the year following their accrual.
13. The rate applicable has been 10 percent. For one description of these 
legislative provisions see Hobbie (1982).
14. This legislation also changed the triggering mechanism used to ac 
tivate EB programs in the states. Subsequent EB payments have been 
much lower than what would have been paid previously. Because half of 
EB payments are state financed, this change also helped improve the 
fiscal balance of UI programs.
15. See Hobbie (1982).
16. The FSC program has no direct financial implications for the states 
as these long term jobless benefits are financed entirely from federal 
general revenues. The program was subsequently extended three more 
times and scheduled to last until the end of March 1985.
17. The 1983 Wisconsin legislative changes that satisfy these TEFRA 
financial requirements are described in chapter 2.
18. For a state forced to borrow in 1983, the increase in net solvency 
must be at least 25 percent in 1983 and then 35 and 50 percent in 1984 and 
1985. Some states that have made adjustments, e.g., Michigan, made 
more than a 50 percent net solvency adjustment immediately in 1983. 
The change in net solvency is computed as the sum of two percentage 
changes: the increase in taxes and the reduction in benefits where both 
are measured as changes from a baseline projection based on prior UI 
laws.
19. To be eligible for lower interest rates in the second and third years of 
indebtedness, the increases in net solvency needed to be 80 and 90 percent 
respectively.
20. See Hobbie (1983).
21. See, for example, Perry (1970).
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22. Insured unemployment rates (or ILJRs) are measured as the ratio of 
insured unemployment to covered employment. The national trigger was 
eliminated in 1981 and the state trigger thresholds were also revised up 
ward by the 1981 legislation.
23. Data on EB benefit payments are shown in U.S. Department of 
Labor (1984a). Estimates of annual tax payments by employers for the 
federal share of EB costs can be made from this same publication.
24. In 1983 a second "temporary" increase in PUT tax rates became ef 
fective. The PUT rate was increased by . 1 percent to .8 percent of taxable 
payroll. Part of the increased tax rate was earmarked to pay for the 
federal share of EB costs.
25. Noncharged benefits are not assigned to individual employer trust 
fund accounts. They are treated as a common cost to all employers and 
are financed by flat rate state taxes.
26. Because of changes in the EB triggering mechanism enacted under 
the Reagan Administration, the EB program will be much smaller in the 
future. Thus it will not contribute to UI funding problems in future 
years.
27. Recall from table 1-4 that unemployment rates for men 25 and older 
were also very similar in the 1950s and 1970s.
28. For one time series analysis of the gross replacement rate see Hight 
(1980).
29. Until 1979, UI benefits were received as tax-free income. Thus when 
weekly benefits are considered in relation to after tax weekly wages, the 
net replacement rate probably rose more rapidly than the gross replace 
ment between the late 1940s and 1978. Hight (1980) has examined both 
replacement rates. Because UI benefits have been taxable since 1979, this 
has definitely lowered net replacement rates in recent years.
30. For one analysis of reduced UI benefit payments in the 1980-83 
period see Vroman (1984). The paper examines payments under regular 
state UI programs and extended jobless benefits under the EB and FSC 
programs.
